Neil Lennon has work to do on evidence of Cup final display

Nobody saw a contest coming. Hearts had seemingly switched off the second they booked their spot in the final, drawing one and losing four of their five post-split league fixtures to limp over the line in a disappointing sixth place. Pressure was on manager Craig Levein going into the final, and it wasn’t lifted by a line-up that worried many supporters. Aaron Hickey, a 16-year-old who had played just twice previously, started at left-back, while Ryan Edwards, a midfielder that had struggled for game time on loan at St Mirren, started in a central three with Peter Haring and Arnaud Djoum. Uche Ikpeazu was on the bench, and Steven Naismith was injured.

Considering form and selection, Hearts were hefty underdogs when the game kicked off. But they would nonetheless compete, and at times control the match, using a defensive strategy Celtic are becoming increasingly familiar with. Two weeks before the cup final, Rangers had stifled Lennon’s side with a 4-3-3 defensive system featuring an extremely narrow front three of Jermain Defoe, Scott Arfield and Ryan Kent. This trident shifted from left to right, focusing on blocking off the centre and forcing Celtic’s build-up into wider areas. Evidently, Levein watched that game, because his approach on Saturday was eerily similar.

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Most of the time, a 4-3-3 system will look more like a 4-5-1 without the ball, as the wingers  drop off on to the same line as the central midfielders. But here Levein had Sean Clare and Jake Mulraney stay on the same line as lone striker Steven MacLean. The three stayed close to each other and defended zonally, covering the central channels and preventing Celtic’s centre-backs from being able to play forward passes through these areas. The only way Scott Brown or Callum McGregor – the double pivot in Celtic’s 4-2-3-1 shape – could get on the ball was to drop in front of, or to the side of, Hearts’ front three. Even then, they would be closed down quickly and given little time on the ball.

Levein’s strategy was perhaps slightly less aggressive than that used by Rangers a fortnight before, as the front three sat just in front of the halfway line and let Celtic’s centre-backs have the ball. However, it was highly effective in making it difficult for the reigning champions to break the lines as they love to do and instead forcing them out wide to their full-backs, who would often then be pressured by Clare or Mulraney from in to out, thus taking away the pass back inside.

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Hearts’ defensive approach wasn’t quite as intense as some made it out to be. In truth, it was more about compact zonal coverage than pressing high, and more about blocking passing lanes than man-marking receivers. They only stepped up to press when their opponent passed backwards, so as to force them back to goalkeeper Scott Bain and then long. Celtic failed to deal with this, which is why they were unable to get their attacking midfielders, James Forrest, Tom Rogic and Mikey Johnston, on the ball consistently.

One issue with Celtic’s possession was that it was too slow. Passes across their back four were ponderous rather than purposeful, giving Hearts enough time to shift laterally while keeping their shape. There were also very few switches of play from Celtic – they could have drawn Hearts’ defensive block to one side before exploiting the free full-back on the far side with long diagonal balls. What instead tended to happen was: a centre-back would pass to a full-back, Mikael Lustig or Jonny Hayes, who would then pass long, pass backwards, or travel down the flank and put in a fairly harmless cross that was comfortably headed away or cleared by John Souttar or Christophe Berra.

Lustig and Hayes were often free men due to the narrowness of Hearts’ front three defensively, and on the occasions Celtic looked most threatening it was because they worked good situations for their full-backs down the flanks. If they could get one of them on the ball in space in the Hearts half, this then caused a mini-crisis for the Hearts full-backs, whose main tasks were to mark their opposite wingers. In these instances, Hickey and Michael Smith had to move out to close down Lustig or Hayes, meaning Forrest and Johnston could run in behind them and receive through balls. However, due to the aforementioned issues, these instances were rare.

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This was the story of the game for the most part, meaning it wasn’t a particularly entertaining clash for the neutral. With their slow build-up, lack of switches, inability to break lines, failure to get the full-backs combining with the wingers, and their heavy attacking emphasis on crossing from near the touchline, Celtic couldn’t create chances. Hearts, on the other hand, were more interested in destroying opposition chances than creating their own.

The primary objective of Levein’s game plan appeared to be allowing Celtic possession and remaining solid defensively. When they had the ball, Hearts retained their focus on stability over risk-taking. Generally they went long from back to front, aiming for MacLean. This proved successful: the striker won a good amount of first balls and, thanks to the support of Mulraney, Clare, Edwards and Djoum, second balls were picked up reasonably frequently. And, if Hearts did want to play short out from the back, they made sure to have a numerical advantage with Haring dropping between Souttar and Berra to form a three-on-two against Celtic’s defensive front line of Odsonne Edouard and Rogic. As a consequence of Hearts’ risk-averse possession strategy, Celtic struggled to obtain the rewards they usually get from high pressing, rarely turning the ball over in the opposition half.

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Even on frustrating days like this, however, Celtic have the individual quality to capitalise on errors. On a couple of occasions, Hearts defenders switched off. Just past the hour mark a failed offside trap meant Zdenek Zlamal had to come off his line. The Czech goalkeeper didn’t deal well with the responsibility, bringing Edouard down to give away a penalty. Then, with around 10 minutes of normal time left to play, Berra failed to recover his position in the back line after going up for a header, allowing Edouard in to score. The French striker, who had little service all afternoon, was alive for both split-second mistakes. His ability, which at over £9m cost Celtic not far off the other 11 Premiership teams’ 2018/19 transfer spend put together, was enough to snatch victory from the jaws of defeat.

At 2-1 down, the game had completely changed for Hearts. For the first time they were behind, and Levein’s initial plan – while effective – was no longer relevant. Faced with a need for at least one goal, he put Berra up front with the oncoming Ikpeazu as Hearts resorted to long ball after long ball. But rarely did this direct play unsettle, let alone open up, a deeper Celtic back line.

In the end, the cup win meant Celtic achieved total domestic dominance for the third season in a row. But this match in isolation suggested the gap between them and their rivals is narrower than it has been for many a year. The Scottish Cup is Lennon’s to enjoy, but he can’t revel for too long: there are plenty of issues for him to address over the summer.