The riots that plagued England and Northern Ireland had barely begun before the war of words over their nature, causes, and what should be done about them kicked into overdrive.

For some, including many in the mainstream, right-leaning media and even many in the Conservative Party, the riots were simply explained: “mass immigration” was too high, and thus the Government should shut down immigration. These narratives were as often about justifying the riots as they were about explaining them, and they aligned suspiciously closely with the political preferences of those spreading them.

The fact is that the violent rioting we saw had varied participants and many causes. Those appearing the docks facing years-long sentences for their roles in the violence have ranged from hardened neo-Nazis who attacked police to alcohol-addled pensioners with no criminal records. Far from being unusual, this is the norm for such violence.

Nonetheless such violence is fundamentally in the name of a political goal. Whether most of those involved were political activists or not, this was an episode of political contention and must be understood as such.

The concept of contentious politics was developed in the 1990s and 2000s by political sociologists like Charles Tilly and Sidney Tarrow, who sought to dissect the dynamics that create and drive social movements. It refers to the use of disruption by movements and organised political groups to achieve their goals, encompassing a range of tactics from peaceful protests to violent clashes.

Contentious politics is often characterised by a struggle between marginalised groups and the political authorities, but those engaging in political contention are not always marginalised and it explains just as much the contention of the privileged.

Several factors contribute to the emergence of an episode of contentious politics, as we saw in England and Northern Ireland in recent weeks. First, there is the role of the political opportunity structure: the structural conditions that may facilitate or constrain the actions of social movements and political groups. In the UK, and across much of Europe and the West, the political opportunity structure is currently very much a driver of political contention rather than a constraint on it.


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The financial crash of 2008 and austerity economics have created a political opportunity structure defined by deprivation, economic uncertainty, and a gutted public realm. These shifts were exacerbated by the pandemic and cost of living crisis, and in the UK by the effects of Brexit, creating a wellspring of economic discontent.

Combined with the UK’s interminable immigration debates, scapegoating of asylum seekers, and broader political polarisation, the grounds on which far-right groups seek or mobilise could hardly be more fertile. The perceived inaction or ineffectiveness of mainstream political parties in addressing these structural issues has also emboldened these groups, providing them with a sense of opportunity to push their agendas through direct action.

Second, the concept of political framing is crucial, involving the construction of narratives that resonate with the population a group is seeking to mobilise and which justify their actions. Far-right groups are highly adept at framing their actions as a defence of national identity and security, tapping into widespread anxieties about immigration and cultural change. This framing not only legitimises their actions in the eyes of their supporters but also helps to recruit new members to their cause, and is further strengthened and amplified when a pliant media and sympathetic political class lend it legitimacy. The importance of the right-wing media and political figures in empowering the far-right’s framings cannot be understated.

Third, the role of resources cannot be overlooked. Material and organisational resources are crucial for mobilising and sustaining a movement engaged in political contention. The riots simply would not have happened without far-right groups utilising social media platforms to organise, fundraise, and spread their message. The ability to quickly disseminate information, coordinate actions, and attract financial support has significantly enhanced their capacity to mobilise and sustain contentious actions. The idea that the riots were spontaneous, rather than sustained by these networks, is misguided at best.

Lastly, the collective identity of the rioters was crucial, creating a sense of belonging and common purpose that united them. Far-right groups have cultivated a strong collective identity based on nationalism, xenophobia, and opposition to immigration and immigrants, not only motivating individuals to participate in contentious actions but also reinforcing their cohesion.

If all the factors needed to originate and sustain far-right political contention were in place, why did the riots fizzle out? There are three major reasons, in my view. Firstly, the coalition the far-right mobilised was, in the end, much smaller and thinner than they had hoped - enough to take contentious action, but ultimately insufficient for sustaining that contention. In the absence of clear leadership and with thin resources, the moment rioters began being imprisoned their momentum was punctured.

Secondly, the framing changed. By the end, only the far-right themselves were willing to sustain their framing, and the broader political and media classes abandoned them. Without legitimacy, they could not continue mobilising others to their cause.

And lastly, because the country reacted. Activists, trade unionists, local community groups and ordinary people came out in their thousands, in many places outnumbering the rioters hundreds of times over. They sent a clear message: the rioters did not represent the people. At this point, without the myth of popular rebellion to sustain them, the far-right hit a brick wall.

A counter protest in Aldershot against the far-rightA counter protest in Aldershot against the far-right (Image: PA)

What can we learn from this episode, and what should government do to prevent a repeat in the future? Firstly, get a grip on the economy and revitalise the public realm: without economic discontent, the raw materials which the far-right mobilise wouldn’t exist.

Secondly, reject the far-right’s framings. The British political class has spent decades scapegoating immigrants for their own governing failures, and endorsing the sorts of xenophobic narratives that the far right deployed to mobilise rioters and legitimise their actions. That must stop.

And lastly, deprive the far-right networks responsible for the riots of the resources they need to sustain themselves. Go after their money, proscribe them, and prosecute their leaders.

The riots weren’t caused by any single issue, group, or individual. They were caused by a cocktail of factors that enabled the far right to mobilise, address those factors and they will be neutralised. There’s no need for us to see this kind of violence again.