Time is running out to pull Middle East back from all-out war

It has also killed off another line of potential negotiation, that between the US and Iran, at precisely the moment the Islamic Republic’s new reformist president Masoud Pezeshkian, who campaigned on a platform of restarting talks with Washington, created a small window for renewed diplomacy.

Seven hours and 1,500 kilometres separated both targeted assassinations in the two Middle Eastern capitals of Beirut and Tehran last week, but Israel’s actions have set the scene for a full-blown conflict that would pit the Middle East’s most sophisticated military, bolstered by advanced weaponry and hardware, against arguably the world’s most heavily armed non-state actor – Hezbollah.

In the space of a few days, everything has changed. Until July 27, there was growing optimism that Israel and Hamas were close to a ceasefire that would halt their 10-month conflict in Gaza.

The stage was set for diplomats from four countries to set out the details at a meeting in Rome and US secretary of state Anthony Blinken, using an American football metaphor, insisted the talks were “inside the 10-yard line”.

Then, suddenly, a rocket that Israel says was fired from Lebanon killed 12 children on a football pitch in the Israeli occupied Golan Heights, and Israel’s targeted assassinations in retaliation began.

With red lines rapidly shifting and the rules of engagement changing, the US military this weekend began deploying additional fighter jets and Navy warships to the Middle East as both Israel and the US brace for Iran to make good on its vow to respond to the killing of Haniyeh. Such is the intensity and speed of unfolding events in the region over the past 10 months, that by the time this article goes to press, the Middle East may be fully immersed in a major and messy escalation.

Iranian protesters attend a demonstration to condemn the killing of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh as they hold his posters with signs which read in Arabic: "Congratulations Haniyeh!" at Felestin (Palestine) Sq. in Tehran, Iran, Wednesday, July 31, 2024.

Multiple fronts

As the Lebanese journalist and long-time Middle East watcher Kim Ghattas observed in her Financial Times column a few days ago, should that occur, this time retaliation towards Israel “is likely to come on multiple fronts, not just from Iran, and will be harder to intercept and contain”.

Other commentators have also gone as far as to question the motivation and wisdom of Israel’s targeted assassination strategy and the thinking that lies behind it. Alon Pinkas, former Israeli consul general to New York, and now a columnist for the daily newspaper Haaretz writing a few days ago, posed the question out loud that many have been asking quietly as to whether Israel is deliberately provoking an escalation that might drag the US directly into the conflict?

As Pinkas sees it, the assassination of Haniyeh – widely attributed to Israel – is “not about justice, retribution or settling accounts, but flirting with a ‘major escalation’ which itself leads to two possible explanations”.

It’s a case, says Pinkas, of either “Israel did not perform a serious risk-assessment analysis and was motivated instead by instant gratification, with disregard to the ramifications”.

He added: “Or, conversely, that Israel is deliberately provoking escalation in the hope that a conflagration with Iran will drag the United States into the conflict, further distancing prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu from the debacle of October 7 – a calamity that to this day he has not been held accountable for.”

If, indeed, Netanyahu’s motive is to draw the US into all-out war with Iran then that in itself is nothing new. It’s no secret that Israel has long opposed any improvement in US-Iran relations and indeed Netanyahu, for going on two decades, has sought to get Washington to go on the offensive with the Islamic Republic.

As it stands, the last four US presidents have all at various times come under pressure to attack Iran, and it’s hard to imagine that choosing to assassinate Haniyeh at the moment of Pezeshkian’s inauguration and first full day in office could simply be put down to coincidence.

Writing in The New York Times a few days ago, veteran Middle East correspondent Thomas L Friedman noted that in Netanyahu’s nearly 17 years in power he has “both aided and undermined American interests in the region”.

“I would not trust Netanyahu for a second to put US interests ahead of his own political survival needs – since he won’t even put Israel’s interests ahead of them,” Friedman observed bitterly.

Other commentators, too, while not suggesting that Israel is trying to drag the US into war, believe that both countries are far from seeing eye to eye on handling Iran.

“The misalignment between the two countries’ threat perceptions highlights a tension in the US-Israel security relationship (which does not formally obligate the United States to come to Israel’s defence),” wrote Steven A Cook, a senior fellow for Middle East and Africa studies at the Council on Foreign Relations.

“The Israelis want maximum manoeuvrability to pursue their military goals, and they want assurances that the cavalry will come if they get into trouble,” Cook added, in an article in Foreign Policy magazine last week.

Newly-elected President Masoud Pezeshkian delivers a speech after taking his oath in a ceremony at the parliament in Tehran, Iran, Tuesday, 30, 2024. (AP Photo/Vahid Salemi).

Commander killed

MEANWHILE, for their part, both Iran and Hezbollah’s actions have shown their preference to avoid direct conflict despite such Israeli provocations. Tehran, for example, viewed the strike that killed a senior commander of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) outside its consulate in Syria on April 1 as a significant escalation, but after sending a barrage of missiles and drones into Israel that were largely intercepted, did not pursue further escalation.

Likewise, Hezbollah has consistently sought to avoid all-out conflict, even when faced with targeted Israeli strikes on senior figures within its ranks and other strikes deep within Lebanese territory.

Until recently, Iran has been content with its strategy of surrounding Israel with armed proxies like Hezbollah, but it has now also seen Israel strike at its most vulnerable points, from Tehran and Beirut to Hodeidah in Yemen where the Houthi rebels also form part of what has been dubbed the “axis of resistance” against Israel.

These past weeks, however, there has been a palpable shift and dangerous pattern developing, whereby combatants in the region are crossing lines that until now would have been almost taboo.

Twice this year, for example, Israel has bombed Beirut, a city it had not officially targeted since its all-out war with Hezbollah in 2006.

So, when it comes – as most analysts assume it will – how might an all-out war between Israel and its regional adversaries play out? Certainly things have changed since the last time Israel and Hezbollah fully went toe to toe.

“Dynamics have changed since 2006. What would make this time worse is that a war today would not be a conflict just between Israel and Hezbollah” with other members of the Iran-led “axis of resistance” becoming involved, said Sanam Vakil, head of the Middle East programme at the Chatham House think tank who was quoted by the FT.

This “axis” that includes Yemen’s Houthi rebels and militias in Iraq and Syria, as well as Hamas, is “operating and co-ordinating in a transnational way, meaning a war would not be limited to a specific geography and would drag in and impact the wider Middle East”, Vakil added.

Earlier this year, the result of an unprecedented three-year study at the International Institute for Counter-Terrorism at Reichman University, Herzliya, Israel, a 130- page report completed not long before the Hamas attack on October 7, was released revealing some telling aspects related to the level of preparedness for the Israel Defence Force (IDF) and the home front in the event of a multi-front war.

Mourners and Hezbollah fighters carry the coffin of their top commander Fouad Shukur who was killed by an Israeli airstrike on Tuesday, July 30, during his funeral procession in a southern suburb of Beirut, Lebanon, Aug. 1, 2024. (AP Photo/Mustafa

Winning the war

Complied by over 100 terrorism experts, former senior security officials, academics, and government officials, the report entitled “Dealing with the challenges of the battlefield and winning the war” provided some stark and bleak reading.

It detailed, for example, how well prepared Hezbollah was for any all-out conflict with Israel. According to the analysis, as soon as the IDF launches military action against Hezbollah, the Shia militia will begin firing 2,500 to 3,000 missiles at Israel every day.

With 150,000 rockets stockpiled, the paramilitary force has more than enough supplies for a conflict that the report estimates will last for 21 days. This stands in marked contrast to 2006 when Hezbollah and the IDF last went to war. At that time, Hezbollah had just 15,000 missiles and fired just 120 a day.

With a range of just 20 kilometres, they could not reach Haifa, the largest city in the north, whereas attacks could now stretch hundreds of kilometres away into the Negev desert in Israel’s south.

“The expectation of the public and of a significant portion of the leadership, that the Israeli Air Force and effective Israeli intelligence systems will succeed in preventing most of the rocket attacks on Israel, will be shattered,” the report states.

“This is also the case regarding the public’s belief that the threat of Israeli retaliation or a substantial Israeli attack on significant Lebanese assets will force Hezbollah to cease fire or significantly impair their ability to continue attacking Israeli territory.”

The Reichman University report also claims that Hezbollah will attempt to disrupt Israel’s air force by striking hangars storing F-16, F-35 and F-15 planes, while also targeting power plants, electricity infrastructure, and water desalination facilities.

The research also detailed how dozens of Iranian-made suicide drones will fly at very low altitudes towards high-quality targets deep within Israel, directed at weapon factories, IDF emergency warehouses, and hospitals, which will be overwhelmed with casualties beyond what medical teams can handle, far more than even after October 7.

It would be the sheer number of incoming missiles, say experts, that would provide the biggest challenge to Israel’s Iron Dome anti-missile systems, especially if Hezbollah’s attack coincided with that other groups.

Before its release, the Reichman University report was signed off by two IDF generals, Aharon Ze’evi-Farkash and Yitzhak Brik, the former head of Mossad’s intelligence division, Haim Tomer, and the former Home Front Commander of the Northern Front, Orit Adato, among others.

Fears ramped up

AS tensions grew in the run-up to this weekend, a report in the Lebanese daily newspaper Al-Akhbar, which is close to Hezbollah, only further ramped up fears stirred by the Reichman assessment. According to Al-Akhbar, the expected assault on Israel in retaliation for its targeted killings of Fuad Shukr in Beirut and Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran will include Hezbollah, Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Yemen’s Houthis, and other regional groups.

This weekend, at the time of writing, there is a real sense of foreboding across the region and the risks of the conflict spiralling out of control grow with every incident – and the prospect of all parties paying a high price.

Israel has already warned that the “shackles will come off” if its civilians are harmed.

Across the country all military leave has been cancelled, and some airlines have started avoiding some sections of Middle East airspace.

Huge questions remain, however, not least among them being whether the US can avoid being drawn into this escalating conflict.

Some argue that Washington can still stop it but only if it is willing to put clear and public red lines in front of Netanyahu.

To date, as Gaza has shown, however, this is something the Biden administration has failed to do. The problem now is that with every hour and day that passes the Middle East’s old rules of engagement have been erased.

No-one, it seems, is sure about the new ones and therein lies the obvious danger.

Certainly, there is great truth in the view as many observers have pointed out that the path to averting a wider conflict must start with a ceasefire in Gaza.

That however, for the moment at least, is little more than wishful thinking.