Alba will not progress until they deal with the Alex Salmond problem

Last year, before the 2022 Scottish local elections, Mr Salmond predicted a “political breakthrough” for his party, which stood 111 candidates in wards across Scotland. But it was another disappointing election for Alba, failing again to win seats.

Despite these setbacks, Mr Salmond remains ebullient. Speaking to broadcaster Iain Dale at the Edinburgh Fringe, he set out a target of 15% of the regional list vote at the next Holyrood elections, expected in 2026, and 24 seats.

Don’t misunderstand – I’ll be shocked if Alba hits that target. But Mr Salmond led the SNP from permanent opposition into government before winning an “impossible” majority in the Scottish Parliament and bringing Scotland closer to independence than at any point since the passing of the Act of Union. If anyone in Scottish political life has a right to make those kinds of claims, it is Mr Salmond. Moreover, grandiosity and headline-making go hand-in-hand for him.

Minor parties break through in democratic politics through guerilla tactics. They lack established parties’ membership, money, machinery, and brand loyalty. And while all parties are exposed to events outwith their control, minor parties are particularly dependent on taking advantage of opportunities they cannot dictate the timing or nature of.

To be in a position to take advantage of opportunities, a minor party has to do two things. First, establish a basic level of awareness that the party exists and what it is generally for. Then, differentiate the party and carve out a niche that will help pique potential voters’ interests when the time comes To do so, a minor party needs, above all else, the oxygen of publicity.

Mr Salmond knows how to obtain that publicity and build a party brand. Moreover, he knows what kinds of opportunities his party needs and the niche they want to occupy.

Alba have a clear theory of success, as Mr Salmond articulated after last year’s local elections. If no progress is made on independence by the next Holyrood election, Alba would be positioned to win over independence supporters disillusioned with the SNP’s lack of success on the constitutional front.

This strategy rests on two preconditions: SNP decline and failure to progress the independence project, and establishing Alba as pro-independence hardliners.

The first of those two has now occurred, at least in part. The SNP find themselves in an awkward interregnum in the journey towards independence, and SNP support has also declined over this year. Comparing YouGov’s last poll of 2022 to their latest poll this month, the SNP Holyrood constituency vote share has fallen by nine points, their list vote share by eight points, and their Westminster vote share by seven points.

None of this has benefited Alba, who registered a Holyrood list vote share of 3% in the same polls last December and 2% earlier this month. Across polling series, no pollster – except Panelbase, whose Alba vote share was significantly overinflated at the 2021 Holyrood elections – has found an Alba vote share above 3% since the party’s founding.

Alba may have the right idea, but they have failed to put more than a cigarette paper between themselves and the SNP on independence strategy.

Alba’s SNP defectors proposed the de facto referendum strategy years before Nicola Sturgeon adopted it, but it is no longer a differentiating policy – and Alba have articulated no clearer a route to independence than the SNP have.

Their “Scotland United” proposal has not helped Alba to differentiate themselves from the SNP either. What is the point of smaller pro-independence parties like Alba if they argue that the independence movement needs to unite behind a single slate of candidates? Is that not precisely what they would have if Alba and similar parties ceased contesting elections?

Where Alba have managed to differentiate themselves in a high-profile manner, there has been little apparent benefit. They have attracted many in the independence movement alienated by the SNP’s position on gender recognition reform, for example, but a vanishingly small number of voters think that is a priority issue.

Ultimately, they have failed to carve out that secessionist hardliner niche. In Savanta UK’s most recent Scottish polling in June, just 4% of independence supporters said they trusted Alba to campaign for Scottish independence more than the SNP.

In the same poll, nearly half of independence supporters said they did not know whether Alba have good policies, with the remainder split; 77% of independence supporters said that the SNP had good policies.

Partly, their poor polling among independence supporters results from their failure to differentiate themselves from the SNP on independence strategy. But I suspect it has even more to do with the very figure whose public profile has been valuable in establishing Alba’s brand presence on the Scottish political scene.

Savanta UK found that Mr Salmond had a net favourability rating of -46, worse than Douglas Ross (-20) and Rishi Sunak (-28). His net favourability among independence supporters was -21, in contrast to Humza Yousaf’s +31.

Redfield and Wilton’s July poll found that Alba as a party have a net favourability of -36, worse than the Conservatives’ -31.

Far from establishing themselves as pro-independence hardliners who will push the independence project forward when the SNP cannot, Alba have merely become the Salmond party.

As independence supporters look at alternatives to the SNP, there may well be a place for a smaller, more focused, more hardline secessionist party in Scotland. Indeed, we have seen such developments over and over again in other sub-state nations around the world.

But as long as independence supporters see Alba as the Salmond party rather than a true alternative to the SNP, they will fail to carve out that niche and attract such voters their way. For all Mr Salmond’s myriad political talents, his leadership of Alba has become a curse much more than a blessing.