Andrew Neal: Scotland would be well placed to set up domestic intelligence and security agency

An independent Scotland is likely to have a small version of MI5, but not MI6 or GCHQ.

Scotland is well placed to set up a domestic intelligence and security agency. MI5 is a civilian agency with powers of investigation but not law enforcement.

It works closely with other agencies such as police forces and the Joint Intelligence Committee in the Cabinet Office. Other countries closer in population size to Scotland such as Denmark and Norway have domestic security services that work as extensions of the police.

Scotland’s current police arrangements would lend themselves to either set-up. Police Scotland, as a merged centralised service, would be relatively straightforward to extend. In a localised and multi-layered system like the Netherlands it would be more complicated.

Police Scotland already engages in intelligence gathering and covert operations. The National Crime Agency operates in Scotland and covers much of the serious crime that a domestic security service might be concerned with. Parts of these organisations share a home with several other anti-crime agencies at the Scottish Crime Campus at Gartcosh, Glasgow. This hub of Scottish domestic intelligence capability would have an obvious future role.

Scotland would not be able to recreate a serious foreign intelligence service like MI6. Few countries have dedicated foreign services, which require extensive overseas human resources. The same would be true for a dedicated signals intelligence agency like GCHQ.

The Scottish Government proposed in its 2014 Scotland’s Future document to create a single integrated intelligence service. On paper, this would be an unusual arrangement, but in practice, it is a recognition that a Scottish security service would be largely domestically focused, perhaps with a few externally-facing capabilities. Scotland’s newly independent military would also have something akin to the UK’s fourth intelligence agency – Defence Intelligence – as part of its planning and decision-making structures.

It is possible that parts of the existing UK services could be parcelled off to Scotland, such as personnel and regional offices. Some current UK intelligence staff with ties to Scotland might enjoy the challenge of moving here to set up a new service. However, apart from the change of location, career prospects are likely to be less attractive and varied than in the existing UK services.

An independent Scotland would have far fewer security and intelligence capabilities than the current UK. Although domestic serious crime capabilities could largely be met, issues possessing an international dimension would be harder to cover. Foreign intelligence is not only used to warn of threat. It is also a tool to gain economic advantage, including assisting with international negotiations or large business deals. The advanced eavesdropping capabilities of GCHQ would be difficult to replicate, particularly its foreign language coverage and its sheer scale of operations.

However, in Scotland’s favour are the increasing availability of off-the-shelf surveillance technologies and the importance of open-source intelligence. Huge amounts of information can now be found on intelligence targets through open sources, with some analysts estimating that up to 80 per cent of intelligence work is now done in this area. Commercial services can now supply the kind of satellite imagery that once only big states could produce.

For warnings of clandestine threats emanating from abroad, or even from the remaining UK, Scotland would have to rely on intelligence from allies.

The UK would have an obvious interest in a secure Scotland and would be free to pass on its own intelligence, but not intelligence received from other states.

It cannot be assumed that Scotland would be welcomed into the “Five Eyes” intelligence-sharing system with the UK, US, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. Aside from any post-referendum rancour, the other members would need assurance that the new Scottish service met high standards in technology and working practices. However, notwithstanding the question of Faslane, continued Scottish Nato membership will keep Scotland close to the Western alliance, which will be especially important in the context of Russian hostility.

European partners could help. Intelligence sharing and police co-operation with European neighbours has a long history and is underappreciated in Anglo-American debates.

The EU has become a database superpower, gathering and sharing huge amounts of information on migrants, travellers, and criminals. The UK has yet to reach a formal post-Brexit security cooperation deal with the EU, although it has at least signed a Security of Information Agreement for the secure exchange of classified information. Whether an independent Scotland could easily re-join the EU is another question, but this will have a bearing on the amount of intelligence and security co-operation that is possible. Brexit has certainly complicated the question of Scotland’s security.

A final issue is intelligence oversight. The UK has a system of statutory parliamentary oversight of the security and intelligence services. The Scottish public might expect a similar system here, but there are other models used in Europe, including committees of experts, commissioners, and judges.

The latter system might be preferable given the lack of intelligence expertise among MSPs and the lack of spare capacity in the current Holyrood committee system.

Intelligence overseers, as well as Scottish ministers, would not only have to worry about keeping a check on Scotland’s new security service, but also on the appropriate extent of sharing and c-ooperation with its bigger neighbour south of the Border.

Andrew Neal, Senior Lecturer in 
Politics and International Relations at 
the University of Edinburgh and 
Co-Director of the Centre for Security 
Research (CeSeR)