In the mid-1950s Ireland barely had a foreign policy worth the name. External relations consisted almost entirely of the “sore thumb” strategy, as it was proudly called: the perpetual repetition of anti-British resentment over Partition. As one historian put it, the country occupied a “Celtic twilight”, from which “the contours of the surrounding world could only be dimly discerned”.

Yet by the 1960s this situation had been transformed. Ireland was now a leading “middle power”, in company with the likes of Canada, Sweden and Norway. Its initiatives on issues from nuclear non-proliferation to European security were admired globally. In world affairs it truly embodied the cliché about “punching above its weight”.

What drove this national reinvention? In large part, it grew from Ireland’s discovery of United Nations peacekeeping, a rich source of what we would now call “soft power”. The Irish role in UN operations in Lebanon, the Congo and Cyprus gave shape and purpose to its defence forces and generated a new national pride. Irish peacekeepers’ boots on the ground in these zones of conflict then opened up a larger UN role for the country which in turn created a wholly new diplomatic identity.

Peacekeeping, Ireland divined, is the one area of military engagement where “smallness” is a positive advantage. No country wants to be “peacekept” by big, overbearing powers with their own agendas. This is a basic principle of peacekeeping and it has obvious implications for Scotland’s post-independence choices.

Scotland, of course, would not have such a high hill as Ireland to climb. Its soft power is already well-established even without statehood. Moreover, the likelihood of an independent Scotland being a member of both Nato and the EU – options not available to Ireland as it developed its peacekeeping role – would give it a ready-made diplomatic springboard.

The numbers seem to favour Scotland as well. Like Ireland it has a population upwards of five million. Its military footprint, however, would be greater. The scope of Scotland’s defence plan was set out in the 2013 White Paper. Ten years after independence it would have a 15,000-strong regular defence force. This would position it well for overseas peacekeeping when compared with Ireland’s current regular force of 8,700.

What price would have to be paid in exchange for the global political benefits of a UN peacekeeping role? A fairly small one, it would seem.

Peacekeeping operates in a permanent seller’s market. The troop contributing country (or ‘TCC’ in the abbreviation-besotted world of peacekeeping) mainly sets the terms of its own engagement. The balance of power in the peacekeeping relationship lies firmly with the contributing state. “Market forces” operate. National contingents can be difficult to find.

In recent years, partly to meet this problem, there has been a shift to countries from the global south in the constant search for TCCs. This has been a good thing in many respects but it has also raised questions about the training and professionalism of some contingents and there’s been a growing sense that the traditional European players should be enticed back. There are few boxes, then, that Scotland wouldn’t tick for UN planners.

Scotland, in common with other contributing states could pick and choose the operations it signed up to. Conditions can be set, at least within limits. In 1964, for example, when the UN was desperate to recruit contingents for its new Cyprus force, Ireland agreed to participate only if the idea of partition was ruled out of any potential peace settlement. Irish soldiers could have no part such historically charged “solution”.

Nor are contributions ever open-ended. In 1973 when the Troubles threatened to spread south, all Irish personnel were quickly repatriated from UN service in the Middle East. More recently, Ukraine was able immediately to pull its forces from UN operations in Africa after the Russian invasion. While any such existential crisis seems unlikely for Scotland, this room for manoeuvre must always be reassuring for national planners. In general, UN peace operations on the ground are not high-risk ventures. With some lurid exceptions few missions place personnel in serious harm’s way. And, of course, those that might do so can always be rejected.

Financially, the UN aims to keep peacekeeping revenue-neutral for its TCCs. Contributors are currently paid about $1,500 per head monthly for their personnel. Equipment is also paid for. This might not be as critical for Scotland as it is for other small-state “activists”. But it should certainly be a factor in policy planning.

There are other tangible advantages which might be more important to Scotland than finance. Multinational operations bring the opportunity for practical contact and co-operation with other militaries. This can be a major benefit for small states looking to foster and consolidate their bilateral relations. The attraction in this for a new state, literally making its way in the world, is plain.

Peace operations aren’t restricted entirely to the UN, of course. Scotland’s plans for a return to the European Union could be important here. The Lisbon Treaty in 2007 set the task of advancing the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy. International “out-of-area” peacekeeping was an explicit part of this. Different models have been considered, including the creation of exclusively “in-house” EU peacekeeping structures. At a less ambitious level, the EU might develop its own identity within the broader framework of United Nations operations. This would involve the EU acting as a single though multinational contributor to UN missions. In either model there are obvious opportunities for Scottish to bring much to the table.

The balance sheet then points to the peacekeeping role as a potentially rich component of post-independence policies in both the diplomatic and security realms.

Of course, this is the situation in 2022. The prospect of Scotland as an international peacekeeper is for the future. UN peacekeeping has been slowing. No new missions have been mandated for several years. The reasons for this are various, not least the increasingly fractured state of global politics. Peace operations require the consent of the entire UN Security Council and this is just not there for now. There’s been a drift back to the polarisation of the Cold War years under way since long before Ukraine.

Yet despite this, 12 UN peacekeeping missions, involving upwards of 90,000 personnel, remain in place. The need for more troops from more countries remains pressing. Ireland, our comparator, is involved in four of these United Nations operations as well as two European Union ones. The door will certainly still be open for Scotland, if and when it becomes equipped with the status to step through it.

Dr Norrie MacQueen has written a number of books on the UN and peacekeeping. He taught at Dundee and St Andrews Universities and was part of the UN Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste.