The SNP needs a broader strategy to make a de facto referendum work

Attention focused more squarely on the Scottish Independence Referendum Bill and its reference to the Supreme Court. But since an SNP special conference was announced for March following the Supreme Court’s decision, a growing chorus of politicians and activists on the gradualist wing of the SNP have begun to express disquiet with the new strategy.

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Their concerns range from the risks posed by losing such a de facto referendum to the difficulties posed by narrowly winning a contest, the meaning of which is not shared by their opponents who retain – let’s not forget – the real levers of constitutional power.

So, what can a de facto referendum deliver for the Scottish independence movement, and what can it not?

Let’s start by being clear about what a de facto referendum is. It is not a General Election fought on the issue of independence – that cannot be determined by SNP. Rather, it is an election in which the SNP and other pro-independence parties campaign singularly on the proposal that Scotland should be an independent country and that if they win a majority of the vote, then they will treat that as a mandate to negotiate Scotland’s secession from the UK.

Nothing about that is binding on the UK Government or the pro-Union parties in Scotland. Indeed, the latter will argue that the election isn’t about independence at all. The SNP’s primary challenger in Scotland, Scottish Labour, will counter that independence is a distraction from tackling the economic and societal crises in which we are embroiled.

No matter how often pro-independence activists misquote Margaret Thatcher to claim that a majority of pro-independence Scottish seats at Westminster constitutes a mandate for secession, there is no mechanism whereby a Westminster vote leads to independence.

In the end, this is the difficulty in which the Scottish independence movement finds itself: a de facto referendum cannot, as a strategy, deliver independence. The SNP can win as many votes as it likes in Scotland but will never control the power to secede.

In this, the Scottish independence movement is not alone. This is a cold, hard political reality faced by practically all secessionist movements globally – yet some succeed. Could a de facto referendum as a tactic, not a strategy, help to move the Scottish independence movement closer to its goal?

Think of secession as a game, what Ryan Griffiths, a political scientist and expert on secessionism at Syracuse University, calls the sovereignty game. The goal of the game is to become an internationally recognised, sovereign state.

There are many strategies open to secessionist movements generally, but for the most part these are not available to the Scottish independence movement. For example, it is in no position to compel the British state to consent to secession.

Nor can it successfully appeal to the international community to pressure the British state. As was confirmed in November, the aspects of international law that provide pathways to secession to colonised or oppressed nations do not apply to Scotland. And as the Catalan independence movement discovered, Western democracies will stick together rather than support a secessionist movement in an allied state.

The only way the Scottish independence movement can win the sovereignty game in the foreseeable future is by persuasion and political pressure. By winning the majority of Scots over to their cause and using that support in combination with appeals to democracy to pressure the British state to concede, at least, a mechanism by which secession might be achieved.

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This is no easy task, as the SNP know. Winning majority support in a nation already polarised on the question of independence is an uphill struggle. To make matters worse, a narrow majority is unlikely to make the British state budge – they would need to demonstrate the support of a large majority of Scots.

To manage this will require sufficient time, bodies, and persuasive arguments. This is where a de facto referendum tactic might be helpful, providing a focal point for campaigning, motivating activists to mobilise and drawing attention to the independence movement’s substantive arguments, as opposed to endless and rather dull arguments about process.

Of course, it remains high-risk – losing such an election would set the independence movement back considerably. But such risks may prove more motivating and create a greater sense of urgency among activists than a fourth election in a row campaigning for a referendum.

The independence movement must generate momentum and overcome the political inertia of years spent arguing about process if it wants to start building the kind of public backing for independence that it will need to win.

A de facto referendum may provide a political moment in which this can be done, but it won’t win independence and carries significant risks. It cannot be a last-ditch attempt to secure independence, as the Scottish Greens’ leadership has characterised it.

If navigated skillfully, it could provide a way to begin to break the deadlock in our constitutional debate – a broader strategy is required to ensure that outcome. This strategy has not been forthcoming thus far.

Few secessionist movements win the sovereignty game. The Scottish independence movement’s path to victory is narrow and seems to grow narrower over time. Whether Nicola Sturgeon’s de facto referendum is a foolhardy bet that backfires or a skilful tactic that breaks open a path to victory, only time will tell. But she needs a broader strategy and more persuasive arguments if she is to be remembered as the leader who delivered independence.