Ben Martill: Would Nato welcome an independent Scotland as a member?

Both events, though highly distinct, have shaken the foundations of European political life to their core, but while Brexit has brought about greater fragmentation, the Russian war in Ukraine creates demand for pan-European solidarity.

For supporters of Scottish independence, this raises a difficult question: How to reconcile withdrawal from the UK with the need to bolster regional solidarity. One option, in light of recent events in Ukraine, might be Scottish membership of the NATO alliance.

The Origins of the Atlantic Alliance

NATO has its origins in the 1949 North Atlantic Treaty, the product of intense lobbying by Britain and France for an American commitment to European security that could bring the United States’ vast military capabilities (including its nuclear arsenal) to bear on the task of containing the Soviet Union. This was achieved through the collective defence clause, Article V, which stipulated that an attack on any one ally was to be considered an attack on all.

Over the years, NATO provided not only a platform for transatlantic solidarity against the Soviet threat, but also an institutional framework that made defence cooperation more efficient, with the position of Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR – always an American general) and standardization of armaments across the allies.

While pundits predicted the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s would spell the demise of NATO, the alliance proved useful as an operational platform for dealing the very different kinds of conflict in the Balkans, as well as being highly prized by the former Communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe, which regarded NATO membership as a bulwark against any renewed threat from Russia.

Scotland and NATO: The Backstory

Scotland is currently part of NATO only by virtue of its status as a constituent part of the United Kingdom, which is a member of the alliance. But the prospect of a second referendum on independence, seen as increasingly likely following the shock to UK politics of the 2016 Brexit referendum, raises the question of whether and independent Scotland would seek to become a member of NATO in its own right.

The independence movement has itself been sceptical of NATO membership. This is partly because of long-standing linkages with the political left, which has regarded NATO as a militarist organisation responsible for ossifying political fault-lines, reinforcing American hegemony and maintaining the ‘balance of terror’ during the Cold War. It is also partly because the presence of the UK’s nuclear deterrent in Scotland makes the territory a prime target in the event of a large-scale conflict.

But this position has been steadily eroded over the years. The independence movement no longer embodies the leftist thinking of the 1970s, in common with many social democratic movements across Europe, and the question of NATO membership is far less salient today. Moreover, the practicalities of independence, and the desire to minimise any disruption resulting from a break with the rest of the UK; the ‘defence union’ proposed in 2013 prior to the independence referendum would have provided for helpful continuity in this regard.

Most recently, the Russian war in Ukraine, launched on 24 February this year, has provided the catalyst for re-thinking the value of the Atlantic alliance. The invasion represents a clear step-change amid the rising geopolitical tension of recent years and has forced a number of neutral countries to reconsider their relationship with NATO. Sweden and Finland have applied to join, while Ireland is mooted to be considering membership.

Membership still comes with costs. Members are asked to commit 2% of GDP spending – with 20% of this earmarked for more valuable R&D spending – and this may be difficult to meet in a fiscally straitened post-independence context. Politically, as a clear statement of non-neutrality, membership of the alliance would not only be seen by some as a threat to an independent Scotland’s more civilian identity, but would also disappoint those who believe active containment of Russia is likely to bring about greater mistrust in the longer-term.

Would NATO welcome Scottish membership?

NATO membership is not automatic. Interested states must apply, and the decision to admit new members is not one that is taken lightly, given the geopolitical stakes involved and the risk to the alliance of accepting uncooperative members. Moreover, the decision on admittance is unanimous, meaning any member could potentially veto Scottish accession. And, as Turkey’s objection to Sweden and Finland’s application has demonstrated, this is no idle threat.

An application from Scotland might stand in good stead, for several reasons. Scotland will already have been an alliance member through the UK, meaning not only that the alliance’s geography would not change, but also that Scottish membership would be the only way of ensuring military capabilities north of the border could remain in the alliance. Mutual NATO membership also offers a partial solution to the perceived risks of independence in the UK, including fears the UK’s nuclear deterrent would have to be relocated.

But it might not be so simple in practice. The UK has an incentive to make life more difficult for Scotland post-independence, and will not readily offer viable solutions to make independence a smoother ride. Other NATO members, such as Spain, may equally seek to quash the prospect of Scottish membership, lest its own regions seek this as a model for secession with fewer complications. And Erdoğan’s Turkey may well make use of any further veto opportunity and the leverage over the alliance this brings.

Not the end of the world?

If Scotland’s request to join NATO were rebuffed, or made more protracted, it might not be all that damaging.

Scotland’s geographical location makes it hard for any attack not to cross the territory or airspace of the alliance, and NATO members would be unlikely to stand-by were an attack to take place. In this respect, Scotland would benefit from the same implicit protection France benefited from after withdrawing from the alliance’s unified command structure in the 1960s.

Much could also be achieved bilaterally, as in the case of the UK’s recent security guarantee to Finland and Sweden prior to their hoped-for entry into the alliance, and multilaterally, through joint exercises with the rest of the UK and other Nordic states.

The EU treaties also contain mutual defence provisions, in Article 42.7, although these are widely regarded as less credible than the NATO alternative, and Scottish membership of the EU would be perhaps more contentious than its membership of NATO.

Whether or not Scotland would be welcomed by NATO remains an open question for now. And it is made all the more complex by the politics of independence, since the viability of NATO membership will be used by both sides in the debate (and, no doubt, by Westminster) to try to steer citizen preferences ahead

Dr Benjamin Martill is a Lecturer in Politics and International Relations and a member of the Europa Institute at the University of Edinburgh