THE extraordinary, brave protests in Belarus raise hopes of a successful democratic breakthrough for the small country long oppressed under Alexander Lukashenko’s authoritarian reign. But while EU leaders held a special summit yesterday, which called for new elections and agreed on sanctions, how Vladimir Putin may respond remains uncertain and critical in this era of strategic rivalry.

Some commentators have been quick to argue that, if its peaceful revolution succeeds, Belarus should nonetheless remain within Russia’s sphere of influence – with no question of EU or Nato membership. Others riposte that this small European country should have the freedom to choose its future path and alliances.

Pragmatic realpolitik or values and freedom – it’s an old debate. And it was a debate held too after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, and with the break up of the Soviet Union in 1991.

Some Cold War warriors argued then that the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania could not realistically join Nato as it wasn’t feasible to give them the Article 5 guarantee of common defence in case of attack. Others argued for a wide expansion of Nato as “the victors”. Some questioned whether Nato had a role at all, given the disbanding of the Warsaw Pact in 1991.

Meanwhile, for several EU member states, in the early 1990s, the prospect of enlarging to all the central and eastern European countries raised concerns about diluting the EU’s power. France pushed successfully for more EU integration, not least a single currency, to happen first. But in the end, Europe’s two key institutions of the EU and Nato both expanded substantially by the early noughties.

The EU was transformed in many ways by its large enlargement. But geopolitical limits were also soon established. Some 1990s think tank debates had suggested, with the end of the Cold War, that not only Ukraine but even Russia could one day join the EU (quite a stretch). Several proposals for a broader, more variegated EU or security structures were floated.

But all this was too far for the politicians. And so the opportunity for a major strategic rethink of the key economic, political and security organisations in Europe was passed up at a time when it might have been achievable.

There were other, less powerful pan-European bodies. Ukraine and Russia, amongst many others, did join the Council of Europe in the mid 1990s. And the EU made efforts to establish so-called “common spaces” (on economic and security issues) with Russia – torpedoed by Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014. But the post-1989 opportunity to transform European politics away from a spheres of influence realpolitik divide missed its moment.

Belarus – not in the Council of Europe – did join the low-profile, cumbersome Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in 1992. Its sprawling membership covers 57 states across Europe, central Asia and North America. A strategic, heavy weight body, it is not.

The OSCE was even mooted, this week, as a possible interlocutor in Belarus in a conversation between president Mr Putin and European Council president Charles Michel. EU-Russia relations are weak, not least in the face of Russia’s own authoritarianism, the annexation of Crimea, and interference in US and European democratic processes. Nor does President Trump’s erratic, destabilising foreign policy, and his warm relationship with Mr Putin, help.

What is clear is that Europe lacks serious strategic organisations that reach across the Russia-EU divide and their shared wider neighbourhoods. And tackling that gap in an age of strategic rivalry is difficult, perhaps impossible.

Still, the EU’s eventual enlargement to 11 central and east European states was a major response to the collapse of the Soviet bloc (despite woeful EU hubris at the start of the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia). Indeed, the EU’s expansion from six to now 27 members has been seen as underpinning European democracy. With Greece, Portugal and Spain joining the EU in the 1980s after emerging from authoritarian and fascist regimes, enlargement was hailed as the EU’s most successful foreign policy. Today, that record seems more tarnished as Poland and Hungary renege on democratic principles and the EU struggles to respond effectively. Yet the successful role played by newer member states from Estonia to Slovenia shows the more positive side of the EU’s soft power.

But some suggest that the EU’s much tougher policy conditionality for the central and east European states actually undermined their democratic development. The LSE’s Dr Abby Innes argues this harmed the rebuilding of democracy by limiting genuine, contested ideological and policy debates – and helped to contribute to today’s populism in Hungary and Poland.

Even so, the EU remains a pole of attraction – including to several western Balkans states. But their EU accession process is moving slowly. And Russia has not been slow to meddle in the Balkans too.

Overall, the EU remains particularly unsure how to deal with its big neighbours to its east. It has an association agreement with Ukraine and a customs union with Turkey (an increasingly troubled relationship as Turkey’s heads further down its authoritarian path). And a deeply fractious relationship with Russia.

In an ideal world, a strategic rethink of pan-European organisations would surely beckon. But the prospects for this look much worse now than they did back in the 1990s not least in the face of strategic rivalry, populism and authoritarianism.

There is a similar dilemma at global level too. With geopolitical challenges including climate change, the Covid pandemic, and the US and China stand-off, the key international institutions need rethinking. The UN Security Council reflects a 1945 balance of power. And, under Mr Trump, the US has withdrawn from the Paris Agreement on climate change and from the World Health Organisation.

But the world is not in a place that would allow such a strategic rethink. This could change – the outcome of the US presidential election one key part of the jigsaw. For now, we can only hope pragmatic diplomacy may help to support Belarus in a peaceful revolution and not just abandon it to Russia’s sphere of influence.

Tackling big challenges at global and European levels needs an emphasis on values and principles, and strategic nous in re-fashioning global and European institutions. But that needs international consensus and a substantial lessening of geopolitical rivalry. If not, our troubling, unstable global politics looks set to continue.

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