By Lindsay Mackenzie

Last Sunday Vladimir Putin was re-elected as Russia’s president. There was no credible political opposition. The public, and any discussion of policy, was kept at arms length. Mr Putin’s campaign resembled one very slow, very sterile, photo-op. While the president has never been one for political engagement, this election season was particularly dry.

This will likely be Mr Putin’s final term in office. It is easy to forgot that he has been in power for almost two decades. Thanks to an oil boom during his first presidential stint, millions of Russians were lifted out of poverty. Life expectancy rose, health care improved, and a middle class life of shopping and travel became available to many. This became the bedrock to Mr Putin’s social contract with the Russian population. At the same time, the ground work was set for the kleptocratic authoritarianism which would allow him to rule the country unchallenged.

Russia is now run by a small political and financial elite in a system based on loyalty to the president. Government institutions have been hollowed out, stripped of their autonomy. Power does not move through accountable channels. Instead, it is held in the hands of those in charge of corporations, banks and media. Personal relationships determine wealth and access. Those who challenge this system are marginalised, arrested, driven out of the country, or killed.

The Herald:

Putin victory rally outside Kremlin

In Russia, politics is not about competition. The state seeks the population’s acquiescence rather than their participation. Elections are depoliticised. Expectations of what they can achieve are low. Instead, the theatre of voting is a ritual to keep Mr Putin in power – a man increasingly depicted as above politics. This allows individuals to decry their crumbling schools, roads, and hospitals, but turn their outrage on regional governors rather than the president.

With elections essentially scripted, turnout takes on a new symbolism. We saw this on Sunday. Manufactured competition and fabricated enthusiasm were rolled out amongst a carnival-like atmosphere of food, competitions, and discounted shopping. It was a friendly facade to the more traditional voter intimidation and ballot-stuffing. This focus on turnout reveals a defining characteristic of the Putin regime; it demands electoral legitimacy while denying basic political freedoms.

But if the vote was a mere formality, what happens next is less certain. The constitution limits a president to two consecutive terms. Unless this is tinkered with, or a ‘seat-warming’ candidate emerges, this will be Mr Putin’s final six years of (official) power. What will he do with them? Time will likely be spent making sure whatever is to follow protects him, his legacy, and key parts of the system he has spent his entire political career constructing.

The Herald:

Victorious Putin

It will be a bumpy few years. An orderly transition to a post-Putin world will require the balancing of competing interests amongst a Russian elite already thinking about life after the president. Mr Putin has traditionally been a ‘manager’ of factional struggles, resolving them behind closed doors. But recent jostling for influence, and the public airing of personal disagreements, has raised questions about the president’s own position. Has he become indifferent toward conflict below him? Or does he no longer feel confident enough to step in? How power is distributed over the next six years will be important.

Then there is the economy. It has proven to be more resilient than many had thought, particularly in the face of a fluctuating oil price and western sanctions. But without structural reform and a diversification away from hydrocarbons, it faces long term stagnation. In a speech earlier this month, Mr Putin set out a prosperous and digital future for Russia. He addressed concerns over public spending, wages and poverty levels. But for all the promises, there was little substance. There is no agreement within Mr Putin’s inner circle on an economic strategy.

Finally, what about relations with the West? It’s difficult to see anything other than continued confrontation. As the economy has lost its shine, a ‘fortress Russia’ narrative has filled the void. Rhetoric about the threat from hostile powers has become common place. Russia is portrayed as a country surrounded by enemies. Mr Putin, so it goes, is the only capable defender of the homeland.

This has proven popular. To many, the president has restored the country’s great power status. The annexation of Crimea continues to be a patriotic rallying point. Yet this has its limits, and its costs. Military adventurism is expensive. Enthusiasm for conflict in Ukraine is waning. Internationally, Moscow is regarded as increasingly destructive and untrustworthy. If the Kremlin really wants to modernise its economy it will have to integrate globally, including with the West. It doesn’t appear to want to.

The Herald:

The Kremlin

Over the next six years Mr Putin will need to make a decision about his own future, and to an extent, that of Russia’s. His popularity is a complex web of genuine support, reluctant acceptance and apathy. It is not set in stone. Nor is what will replace him and his rule once he is gone. The Russian people want what we want. Democracy, rule of law, accountability. They are still waiting.

Lindsay Mackenzie is a writer and editor for CABLE, Scotland’s online international affairs magazine.