ONE of the bloodiest terrorist attacks ever, the explosion of the
PanAm jumbo above Lockerbie in 1988, has never been solved. Two Libyans,
according to the early version, allegedly carried out the crime alone.
This report, by Der Spiegel journalists, following a trail that took
them to Berlin, Budapest, Geneva, and Moscow, unearths new leads leading
to Germany. The key figure, a Swiss businessman, turns out to have been
in the pay of the East German security service for almost 20 years --
and possibly worked for the CIA as well. KGB officials say they knew of
the connection -- and are astonished that the Americans have yet to ask
them about it.
A COLOUR photo, magnified 15 times, reveals only a scorched fragment
of a chip of green synthetic resin smaller than a fingernail. Only
magnification allows one to see the soldering typical of an electronic
circuit board.
Nor does the picture of a two-part plastic housing reveal much at
first glance. The upper and lower part are held together by a wire. Not
visible from the outside are two dials mounted on the plastic.
Electronics experts say the dials were used to set a timer, necessary
for the precise detonation of a bomb.
Secretive men have been presenting such photos for months to
investigators in Berlin. Swarms of secret agents from the intelligence
services of all the world are here; it is as if the Cold War had never
ended and Berlin was the spies' capital.
For German investigators, this is a ''home game''. Officials of the
Federal Office for the Defence of the Constitution, colleagues from the
State Security Service, investigators from the Federal Criminal
Investigation Agency, and public prosecutors from Berlin and Frankfurt
are trying to solve the toughest political crime puzzle of recent years:
the history of the timer.
One question is: whose hands held the clock? Terrorists may have used
such a timer to detonate the bomb that ripped apart the PanAm jumbo.
All 259 aboard, most of them US citizens, were killed, along with 11
people on the ground.
Many people thought the case was officially closed. American and
Scottish authorities claimed in November 1991 that two Libyan secret
agents, Amin Shalifa Fuheima, then 35, and Abdel Bassit Ali el-Mikhrahi,
then 39, were behind the Boeing 747 outrage. Once again, the hand of
Libya's chief of state, Moammar Gaddafi, was seen lurking behind Arab
terrorism.
The US Justice Department demanded the extradition of the two suspects
-- in vain. The United Nations decreed an embargo of Libya as a result,
and tightened it last November.
But new facts have emerged that cast serious doubt on the hypotheses
pieced together so far. Investigators and agents speak of a ''German
trail'' -- and it is hot.
Lockerbie, according to Scotland Yard, was ''the most expensive piece
of detective work in criminal history''. Fifteen thousand witnesses were
interviewed, 20,000 names checked, 35,000 photos analysed, 180,000
pieces of evidence evaluated.
One German trail was discovered almost from the beginning: in all
likelihood, the deadly luggage came from Frankfurt. According to
investigators, the suitcase bearing the bomb reached the German airport
on the morning of December 21, 1988, on an Air Malta flight and was
transferred to the PanAm jet as unaccompanied luggage.
Around 1.07pm, a computer gave the bronze-coloured Samsonite suitcase
the code number B-8849. Then, between 3.12 and 4.50, it was loaded,
unchecked, on to flight 103 to London, a stopover on the transatlantic
flight.
But there is a new German trail. It leads to East Berlin and the
former Ministry for State Security, the Stasi. Prominent names from the
ministry have recently been added to a list of witnesses to be
interrogated. Not only former Politburo members but Egon Krenz, who
succeeded East German leader Erich Honecker, have been named. Everything
revolves around one question: when was the timer given to whom, and for
what purpose?
No-one is saying that Lockerbie was the Stasi's direct work but it
seems Stasi officers may have provided key assistance to an Arab state
or terrorist group. It has been discovered that detonators of the
Lockerbie type were in the possession of the ministry.
From the beginning, the key to the Lockerbie puzzle was a piece of the
tape player that investigators found after an exhaustive search of the
crash site.
It was found burned into a shirt collar belonging to one victim, Karen
Noonan.
In weeks of painstaking work, the Scottish specialist Thomas Hayes was
able to identify the plastic fragment, production number PT 30, as part
of the detonator. That indicated that the Lockerbie bomb was of the same
type as one built two months earlier by a group of militant Palestinians
in the German city of Neuss. The explosive used in both cases was Semtex
H; in
both cases, a lump of it was hidden in a Toshiba radio recorder.
The Palestinian group in Neuss used a barometric detonator, which
would set off a bomb explosion after a change in air pressure -- for
example, when an airplane had reached a certain altitude. As a result,
the Neuss terrorists, operating under Syrian sponsorship, were long
considered leading suspects in the Lockerbie attack.
However, when it became absolutely clear that the explosives on flight
PanAm 103 were set off by a simple timer, the investigation took another
direction.
CIA analysts led investigators to the Mebo AG firm in Zurich. It deals
with electronic devices of all sorts. The timer was part of one it had
produced -- Type MST-13 -- in 1985 for use by Libyans in desert warfare.
It was both dust and water-tight.
According to the CIA, one of these timers was used in 1986 in a bomb
attack on the American Embassy in Togo. In February 1988, two Libyans
were arrested in Senegal in connection with that attack; they had 10
kilograms (22lbs) of plastic explosives and two MST-13 timers in their
possession. Though the name of the manufacturer had been scratched off,
lab technicians were able to make it out: Mebo.
Fewer than two dozen of the timers were produced, all of them
apparently for Gaddafi's people. Mebo officials told the CIA, as well as
American and British Lockerbie investigators, that the timers were sold
only to Tripoli and to the Libyan People's Bureau, or embassy, in East
Berlin. The charges against the two Libyan suspects rest largely on this
evidence.
Yet the Mebo version turned out to be a cover story. Edwin Bollier,
56, one of Mebo's top two executives, claims to have suddenly remembered
six months ago that there was a second client: ''the Institute for
Technical Research or something like that'' in East Berlin.
In fact, that institute, ITU for short, served as a highly-specialised
workshop for the Stasi, making specialist tools such as listening
devices and miniature transmitters for its agents.
At first, investigators believed that the Libyans had bought off
Bollier to exonerate themselves.
Investigators also paid close attention to the fact that in January,
during a Geneva meeting between US President Bill Clinton and the Syrian
head of state, Hafez Assad, in the President Hotel, an intriguing group
was in attendance: the so-called Libyan defence team, including London
lawyer Stephen M. Mitchell and the American defence attorney Frank
Rubino.
Even Bollier found his way to Geneva, where he recounted further
details on the sale of Mebo timers to East Berlin.
It is known that, in 1985, the Stasi acquired MST-13 timers. State
prosecutors say Bollier sold as many as seven of them to the East
Germans. This number comes from a copy of a bill Bollier suddenly
''found''.
Some former Stasi buyers have since admitted ordering MST-13-type
timers. A former Stasi colonel, questioned by the Federal Criminal
Investigation Agency in Munich, has said that his ministry played no
direct role in the Lockerbie explosion but that it was entirely possible
that it had passed along such a timer.
Meanwhile, the Stasi has been linked to other murderous attacks. Not
long ago, its anti-terrorism specialist Helmut Voigt was sentenced to
four years in prison for passing on the explosives used in the 1983
bombing of the Maison de France in Berlin (one dead, 22 injured).
This all raises questions about the earlier theory that the Libyans
acted alone.
Bollier may have worked for the East Germans as an unofficial
collaborator of the Stasi, providing sensitive materials for decades. At
Stasi headquarters, he was registered under file number 2550/70. Bollier
tells Der Spiegel he had no idea he had been given a code name.
In the late 60s, the East Germans had enormous need for electronic
spying devices. The Stasi created a special unit whose mission was to
listen in on the West German telephone network. Its name: Department
III.
Meeting in a Berlin hotel, the department's head, Horst Mannchen,
quickly reached agreement with Bollier. The Swiss would provide the
Stasi with special antennas, coders, police radios, and data terminals.
Mannchen wanted radio equipment for 3000 spies.
The Stasi paid Bollier in cash, hard West German marks. ''Bollier,''
says one former Stasi official, ''did well over a million marks business
with us.''
Bollier's firm also had surprising contacts within the Western
services. Bollier was thus able to obtain a device that was then a
closely guarded American secret: the ''Mark'' voice analyser. The
device, which works like a lie detector, registers subtle changes in the
voice. Stasi's top man, Markus Wolf, wanted it to test the loyalty of
his agents.
However, the Stasi people became suspicious of the ease with which
Bollier was able to obtain the machine. They decided to try to find out
who he really worked for.
Bollier travelled so much and was so active that Stasi agents were
unable to keep a tail on him, and never proved anything but the
suspicion grew that Bollier was also working for a Western service,
probably the CIA, according to one internal report.
Is it possible that a man in the service of the CIA was even
indirectly responsible for the horrible disaster over Lockerbie? German
prosecutors aren't ready to provide a final answer to that. However, one
former Stasi man told investigators: ''A man like Bollier had hidden
protectors in the West.''
When asked by Der Spiegel about CIA contacts, Bollier said simply:
''No comment.''
Mr Joachim Wenzel, a brilliant technician for Stasi, says Bollier
delivered timers to him in 1987, in his offices on Ferdinand Schultze
Street in East Berlin. The Stasi people there had close contacts to
militant Arab groups and also to the Red Army Faction of West Germany.
The timers have since disappeared. It is not clear whether they were
destroyed in the chaos surrounding the end of communist rule, or whether
they found their way into the world of international terrorism.
There were many possible takers. The Stasi's connections to Arab
terrorist groups formed a web with many spiders.
The Stasi, for example, delivered to the security division of the
Palestine Liberation Organisation around 5000 hand grenades, explosives,
and 1000 detonating devices in 1980 alone.
Many splinter groups of the Palestinian movement also found a new base
in East Germany.
The terrorist Carlos, sought around the world for his part in a series
of murderous attacks, spent time in the Palast Hotel on East Berlin's
Unter den Linden boulevard. The fighters of the infamous Abu Nidal took
a three-month course at Stasi headquarters in 1985, including training
with rocket and grenade launchers.
Only months later, the group killed 16 people in an attack on Rome
airport and four in Vienna.
Abu Daoud, who was linked to the 1972 Munich Olympics massacre, lived
in Berlin in the 80s, at Prenzlauer Allee 178.
But who was behind the Lockerbie attack? Was it the Iranians, furious
over the shooting down of an Airbus full of civilians by the destroyer
Vincennes over the Strait of Hormuz in 1988? Did the Syrians help?
The KGB is not convinced by the theory that the Libyans acted alone
and although the Russians are well-placed to have information on both
the Arabs and the Stasi, they have not been contacted by American
investigators. One former head of Soviet foreign intelligence said:
''They haven't asked us a single question.''
[CPYR] Der Spiegel. Distributed by New York Times Syndication Sales.
Why are you making commenting on The Herald only available to subscribers?
It should have been a safe space for informed debate, somewhere for readers to discuss issues around the biggest stories of the day, but all too often the below the line comments on most websites have become bogged down by off-topic discussions and abuse.
heraldscotland.com is tackling this problem by allowing only subscribers to comment.
We are doing this to improve the experience for our loyal readers and we believe it will reduce the ability of trolls and troublemakers, who occasionally find their way onto our site, to abuse our journalists and readers. We also hope it will help the comments section fulfil its promise as a part of Scotland's conversation with itself.
We are lucky at The Herald. We are read by an informed, educated readership who can add their knowledge and insights to our stories.
That is invaluable.
We are making the subscriber-only change to support our valued readers, who tell us they don't want the site cluttered up with irrelevant comments, untruths and abuse.
In the past, the journalist’s job was to collect and distribute information to the audience. Technology means that readers can shape a discussion. We look forward to hearing from you on heraldscotland.com
Comments & Moderation
Readers’ comments: You are personally liable for the content of any comments you upload to this website, so please act responsibly. We do not pre-moderate or monitor readers’ comments appearing on our websites, but we do post-moderate in response to complaints we receive or otherwise when a potential problem comes to our attention. You can make a complaint by using the ‘report this post’ link . We may then apply our discretion under the user terms to amend or delete comments.
Post moderation is undertaken full-time 9am-6pm on weekdays, and on a part-time basis outwith those hours.
Read the rules hereComments are closed on this article