When Polaris arrived, the key question was still unanswered

THE issue of whether Britain would have any control over US Polaris

submarines was yet to be negotiated on the eve of their arrival at Holy

Loch, according to documents now declassified under the 30-year rule

which show the Government's extraordinary sensitivity to publicity at

the time.

The records reveal a split between Britain and the United States over

how to handle publicity, and show the full extent of news management at

the time. The documents also show how the authorities moved to distance

themselves from the honorary sheriffs who handed out harsh punishments

to anti-nuclear protesters at Holy Loch, including a three-month prison

sentence on campaigner Pat Arrowsmith, which created a public furore at

the time.

And in a further cameo from the period, the records now show how the

might of the Nato alliance was held to ransom by a former RAF corporal

who made an eight-fold profit within months of buying Ardnadam Pier,

which was needed for the Holy Loch project.

Senior civil servants were extremely hostile to the idea of permitting

any publicity about the Polaris base, and resisted a US suggestion that

the arrival -- codenamed Operation Lamachus -- of the depot ship USS

Proteus could be used as a major propaganda exercise to produce positive

publicity through the use of the press, radio, television, and local

dignitaries.

''The Americans made the point that unless something of this kind were

to be done, the opposition would continue to take all the headlines and

make the news,'' reported one senior civil servant, adding: ''We think

it would stir up more trouble and provide opportunities for new

criticisms.''

There was particular sensitivity to any comment or criticism from the

Kirk, which in turn took the unusual step of submitting a draft of a

Church and Nation Committee report on the nuclear deterrent to the

Scottish Office for comment. This produced an acid response from one

mandarin, who scribbled: ''The Church ought to be shamed into admitting

the irony behind a situation where they have raised these fundamental

issues in the case of a weapon which, as they say themselves, is a

factor reducing tension.''

Scottish Secretary John Maclay met senior Kirk men at St Andrew's

House on January 9, 1961, but he was briefed to ''stress the informal

and confidential nature of the meeting'' and to ask that ''nothing

should appear in the press''. He was also briefed to assure the Church

delegation that there would be ''joint consultation'' between Britain

and the United States on the operations of the Polaris submarines.

However, elsewhere the files tell a different story. The idea of

holding a press conference to announce details about the Holy Loch

project was resisted by the head of the Scottish Information Office,

William Ballantyne, but he was overruled, and the subsequent briefing

notes produced for answering questions show how sensitive the issues of

control and consultation were.

The question ''What operational control will the Royal Navy have over

the movement of these vessels?'' (the Polaris submarines) was to be

avoided if possible, and the suggested answer was marked: ''To be used

only if pressed''.

It stated: ''This is under discussion with the US authorities. The

lines on which we are thinking is that the RN will organise the movement

of USN ships in harbour and will also co-ordinate the times of arrival

and departure, and that in the event of submarine accident the

captain-in-charge, Clyde, will have powers to order submarines to shift

berth to ensure safety to the public.''

Questions about the movement of subs in wartime were to be deflected

with the answer that this was a hypothetical question.

An earlier draft of the briefing document, then rated ''top secret'',

was more blunt. On the question of operational control of the submarines

it stated: ''This question may arise but we are in no position to give a

definite reply pending discussions with the Americans.''

On the question of why the Holy Loch had been selected, the final

draft of the brief said this was the ''most suitable'' site after ''all

potentially suitable UK ports were considered''. The earlier draft was

more specific, pointing out that in the south only Milford Haven in

Wales and Falmouth in Cornwall had been considered, along with ''all

ports in Scotland''. It was also stated that the Secretary of State for

Scotland had been fully consulted.

As the decision loomed, it was recommended that, as the ''serious

papers support the Government's point of view more or less

wholeheartedly'', efforts should be concentrated on a ''short, pointed

letter to the popular press'' by the Scottish Secretary, coupled with a

briefing in the Lobby at Westminster.

In the outside world, dissident voices grew in strength and by May

there was a demonstration at the Holy Loch which resulted in a fine of

#7 on disarmament campaigner Pat Arrowsmith. Four months later, on the

weekend of September 16-17, she led another protest which resulted in

her being sentenced to three months in Greenock Prison, where she

endured solitary confinement, hunger strike, and forced feeding.

Some 350 other protesters were fined up to #15 for breach of the peace

by honorary sheriffs Donald McDiarmid and Brigadier-General E. J.

Montgomery -- contrasting sharply with fines of no more than #2 imposed

on similar protesters in London's Trafalgar Square, including actress

Vanessa Redgrave and playwright John Osborne.

Civil servants moved swiftly to advise their political masters on how

to distance themselves from the decisions in the wake of an avalanche of

criticism from the public and trade unions, pointing out that unsalaried

honorary sheriffs were the responsibility solely of the acting sheriff

(who was indisposed with a slipped disc) and that in any case the London

offences came under the English statute of the Metropolitan Police Act

of 1839 which carried a #2 maximum fine.

There was clearly little sympathy with the protesters from inside the

Establishment at St Andrew's House, where a complaint by a student

demonstrator that she was held for several hours without food followed

by a delay in returning her money and other possessions was minuted: ''A

good indication of the muddled thinking that goes on in nuclear

disarmament circles.''

The Holy Loch controversy subsided but Fred Burgess, a former corporal

in the RAF, was enriched in the process. The Admiralty rather stupidly

sold him Ardnadam Pier at Sandbank in 1959 for about #500, only to

discover within a matter of months that it would be needed for the

Polaris base.

At one stage Burgess was asking for #20,000. ''I still think it would

be a mistake for the Admiralty to allow themselves to be blackmailed

like this,'' said a civil servant. But the records show that the

Government stumped up #4000. ''This is a very sad story and I do not

think there is any more we can say. There certainly seems very little

prospect now of getting the price down.''

If it is any comfort to the taxpayer in Britain or the United States

(the purchase price was passed on in higher rent to the US Navy), the

final cost was #2000 less than the #6000 which Admiralty would have been

prepared to go to. Perhaps, 30 years on and with the US Navy pulling

out, the pier is back on the market?