Thorns for General Rose

General Sir Michael Rose

Harvill, #18

If you piled up all the books written about the Balkans since 1991 you would notice they tend to lie like geological layers. The early

layers include fast-paced books of reportage, war stories, and the sad-end-of-Yugoslavia books. The next layer includes the first serious books of analysis, then came the howls of moral outrage books. These were followed by the new historical assessments and then the Bosnian ''family at war'' books.

You may have thought all this was enough. But, no, the Balkan publishing volcano is as active as ever. At present it is spewing forth Kosovo books and a selection of ''my war'' books by foreigners who played key roles in attempts, successful or otherwise, to make peace in Bosnia. General Sir Michael Rose, who headed up the UN's mission in Bosnia during 1994, was in the unsuccessful category.

Theoretically, I should remember quite a lot about him. Between 1991 and 1995, as a journalist, I covered the wars of the former Yugoslavia. I remember every detail of 1991 (the war in Croatia), every detail of 1992 (beginning of the war in Bosnia, the camps) and 1995, (NATO's massive bombing campaign and the end of the war.) But, frankly, the bits in between have begun to merge.

There were ceasefires, peace plans, flare-ups, NATO threats, and some modest little airstrikes - but, unfortunately, for General Rose, no memorable triumph over tragedy. Fortunately for the General, W H Smith and others have piled his book high this Christmas. The tough looking former SAS man, looks the part on his front cover and no doubt many a father, grandfather, and military buff will be delighted to find his memoir in their stocking.

However, unless they're particularly interested in the former Yugoslavia, I predict a lot of heavy eyelids, nodding heads, and spilled sherries by Boxing Day. Brutal though the war was, this account is no rival to that James Bond film if it's action that you're looking for. Rose's book is a robust defence of his time in the field, particularly of the much-maligned UN mission in Bosnia. The UN, he points out, could not keep the peace when there was no peace to keep and, besides, its main mission was helping to deliver aid - which it did, despite all the obstacles, with much success. In this sense, Rose's book, like other current ''my war'' tomes, is good for the historical record, if not exactly a scintillating read.

It is perhaps unfortunate then that Rose makes mention of the visit to Bosnia of Sir Fitzroy Maclean, whose own Eastern Approaches, including his account of his Bosnian war, remains a literary classic half a century later. Annoyingly, Rose's book is peppered with small mistakes, including misspellings of names and places. Unintended, one assumes, but this carelessness leaves the reader with the impression the General can hardly be bothered with such niceties, especially since Johnny Foreigner is a

savage anyway.

Having said that, Rose's portraits of the main characters are revealing and valuable. Most of the Serb leadership is dismissed as a collection of brutal drunks. In a meeting with General Ratko Mladic, the Bosnian Serb military commander, Mladic bursts a boil on his nose, leaving ''pus and blood on the table''. Mladic was ''either quite mad, a liar, or completely out of touch with his army. I ruled out the latter possibility''.

The Bosnian Muslim leadership is depicted, with one or two honourable exceptions, as grasping and cynical. Of Bosnian army strategy, Rose writes it consisted of: ''(1) Attack on all fronts; (2) Retreat, amid scenes of appalling suffering; (3) Call on UN and NATO to bomb the Serbs.'' Particularly galling to Rose was the fact the Bosnian leadership's main aim was to involve the Americans. Since the Fifth Cavalry has saved the British bacon twice this century, to condemn the Bosnians for wanting to do the same seems a bit rich. Rose argues, however, this attempt to lure the Americans, and thus Bosnian disinterest in various peace plans that he was involved in, meant they prolonged the suffering of their people.

This was, of course, true but rather misses the point - that the Bosnian leaders didn't see why they should surrender because it was convenient for Rose or because it would save lives. By the same logic Britain should have made peace with Nazi Germany in 1940.

Rose's account of the bureaucratic and political wrangling of the UN and NATO makes salutary reading. The endless quarrels between the organisations were generally conducted by diplomats or officers from the same country who viewed the situation differently by virtue of whom they worked for. The oddest thing in Rose's book is his counter-intuitive view that the 3500 NATO bombing sorties against the Serbs in 1995 had a ''negligible'' military effect. Since the raids led directly to the Serb loss of huge tracts of land and to the peace agreement signed in Dayton, Ohio, Rose might find himself in a minority of one in trying to defend that particular idea.